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Abstract – The safety and protection of workers is a duty of 
their employer. In case of presence of hazardous areas due to 
the risk of explosion, an area classification has to be performed 
to identify the shape and size of the locations where an 
explosion may happen. Two typical cases that can produce 
hazardous areas are gas emissions from a containment system, 
because of normal operation or because of a failure, and vapors 
emissions from an open surface pool of flammable liquid. In this 
paper two studies are presented: the first deals with the problem 
of natural gas releases during maintenance work on the gas 
distribution network, the second with vapors emissions from a 
pool of flammable liquid. In the first case experimental 
measures have been performed to easily calculate the size of 
the hazardous area; in the second case computer simulations 
are used to derive a simplified model to determine it. The results 
of the two studies presented are examined and commented in 
the light of the International and national Standards. 
 
Index Terms — Hazardous Areas Classification, Natural Gas, 
Inflammable Liquid.   
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
For many years the risk of explosion and the consequent 
requirement for the classification of areas has been a concern 
worldwide [1] and in the beginning industry codes were mainly 
used [2]. In 1994 and 1999 the two ATEX directives were 
published by the European Parliament, respectively Directive 
94/9/EC [3] and Directive 99/92/EC [4]. The first deals with 
equipment and protective systems intended for use in potentially 
explosive atmospheres; the latter with the safety and health 
protection of workers potentially at risk from explosive 
atmospheres. In particular, Directive 99/92/EC provides that the 
employer adopts adequate measures in order to prevent the 
formation of explosive atmospheres, avoid their ignition and 
mitigate the detrimental effects of an explosion. Among these 
measures is the classification of the places where explosive 
atmospheres may occur which is particularly important. 
The regulations provided by the second ATEX Directive have 
been adopted in the International and European Standard IEC 
EN 60079-10-1 [5]; in Italy, moreover, in February 2007 a new 
edition of the Guide CEI 31-35, “Guide for classification of 
hazardous areas” [6] has been published. 
Meanwhile in the United States other Standards, with similar 
methods, are used for the classification of hazardous areas [7]. 
The two main different sets of standards, NEC and IEC have 
also been compared for what concerns the protection 
methodologies [8]. 
This paper briefly outlines the area classification procedure, 
describes the approach adopted by the international standard 
[5], illustrates some experimental measures and simulations and 
illustrates some general equations and assessment methods 
developed by the authors and introduced in the new Italian 
national guide [6]. 
 
II.  AREA CLASSIFICATION PROCEDURE BASED ON 
IEC EN 60079-10 METHODOLOGY 
 
Whenever dangerous quantities and concentrations of 
flammable gas or vapour may arise, one of the standards used 
to classify the area is IEC EN 60079-10 [5]. 
Hazardous areas (in which an explosive gas atmosphere is 
present, or may be expected to be present) shall be classified in 
zones on the basis of the frequency of occurrence and 
persistence of the dangerous atmosphere, as reported in Table 
I. 
TABLE I 
ZONE TYPES 
ZONE 0 An explosive atmosphere is present continuously or for long periods or frequently 
ZONE 1 An explosive atmosphere is likely to occur in normal operation occasionally 
ZONE 2 
An explosive atmosphere is not likely to occur in 
normal operation but, if it does occur, will persist for a 
short period only 
 
In accordance with Table B.1 of Standard IEC EN 60079-10-1 
[5] (Table II below) the type of zone can be evaluated, knowing 
three parameters: the grade of release, the degree and 
availability of the ventilation. 
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TABLE II 
INFLUENCE OF VENTILATION AND GRADE OF RELEASE ON TYPE OF ZONE 
 
 
Sources of release are classified in the following three grades 
of release: 
 continuous grade of release when the release is 
continuous  or is expected to occur frequently or for long 
periods; 
 primary grade of release when the release can be 
expected to occur periodically or occasionally during 
normal operation; 
 secondary grade of release when the release is not 
expected to occur in normal operation and, if it does 
occur, is likely to do so infrequently and for short periods. 
Two aspects of ventilation are considered in controlling 
dispersion and persistence of the explosive atmosphere: the 
degree of ventilation and its availability; and the effectiveness of 
the ventilation. 
 
Three degrees of ventilation are identified: 
 high ventilation (HV) can reduce the concentration at 
the source of release virtually instantaneously, resulting 
in a concentration below the lower explosive limit. A zone 
of negligible extent may result (depending on the 
availability of the ventilation); 
 medium ventilation (MV) can control the concentration, 
resulting in a stable zone boundary while the release is 
in progress and in the elimination of the explosive 
atmosphere after the release has stopped; 
 low ventilation (LV) cannot control the concentration 
while release is in progress and/or cannot prevent the 
persistence of an explosive atmosphere after release 
has stopped. 
 
Three levels of availability of the ventilation are considered: 
 good if ventilation is present virtually continuously; 
 fair if ventilation is expected to be present during normal 
operation. Discontinuities are permitted provided they 
occur infrequently and for short periods; 
 poor if ventilation does not meet the standards of fair or 
good, but discontinuities are not expected to occur for 
long periods. 
 
For example if we have a primary grade of release (which 
means that the release can be expected to occur periodically or 
occasionally during normal operation) the degree of ventilation 
is medium (which means that the ventilation can control the 
concentration, resulting in a stable zone boundary while the 
release is in progress and in the elimination of the explosive 
atmosphere after the release has stopped) but the availability is 
just fair or poor (which means that discontinuities in the 
ventilation can be present) normally the hazardous area is 
confined in the Zone 1 but when the ventilation is missing, 
occasionally, a bigger area can be involved (Zone 2). 
 
Once the type of zone has been defined, its dimensions have 
to be determined, choosing an appropriate geometric shape; for 
this purpose the Italian Guide CEI 31-35 [6] uses the dangerous 
distance dz and a certain number of standardized shapes. 
 
III.  THE HAZARDOUS DISTANCE FOR GAS RELEASES 
ACCORDING TO THE ITALIAN GUIDE 
 
The equation for the evaluation of dz (computed hazardous 
distance) in the case of a flammable gas jet is presented, as 
illustrated in the Italian Guide CEI 31-35 [6]. It was worked out 
by the authors in previous works [11],[12],[13]: 
 
  5,04,05,05
vdz
zz AM10PLELk
1650kd 
         (1) 
 
where: 
 A is the cross section of the source of release [m2]; 
 P is the absolute pressure inside the containment system 
[Pa]; 
 M is the flammable substance molar mass; 
 LELv is the substance lower explosive limit, expressed in 
volume per cent; 
 kz is a correction coefficient to account for the gas or vapour 
concentration in the far field (far away from the source of 
release, where the gas or vapour is completely mixed with 
air); in the case of open space release kz = 1; 
 kdz is the safety coefficient applied to the LEL for the 
calculation of dz; assumes values between 0.25 and 0.5 for 
releases of continuous and first grade and values between 
0.5 and 0.75 for second grade releases. 
 
Equation (1) is used to calculate the hazardous distance dz for 
gas releases, when release velocity u0 ≥ 10 m/s. 
 
Experimental measures have been carried out in the case of 
a natural gas release and have been compared with the 
calculations suggested by the Italian Guide CEI 31-35 [6]. 
As sometimes the cross section of the source of release is 
not known, the Italian Guide provides with typical values for this 
parameter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV.  HAZARDOUS AREAS PRODUCED BY MAINTENANCE 
INTERVENTIONS ON N.G. DISTRIBUTION 
NETWORKS 
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A.  The Natural Gas distribution network 
 
The natural gas distribution to domestic and tertiary users is 
performed in Italy by an interconnected network with operating 
pressure of about 20 mbar. This network pipes are usually 
buried, except for some ends, and are usually made of cast iron, 
steel or polyethylene; the pipes cross section ranges from 50 to 
600 mm2. 
The gas network requires repair and maintenance work in 
ordinary conditions, due to users needs (new connections, 
changes of the supply, etc.) and for routine modernization (cast 
iron pipes are gradually being substituted by polyethylene pipes, 
which have lower structural losses and are more versatile during 
repairs and modifications). 
All these operations on the network must be performed with 
as little effect on end users as possible while guaranteeing the 
highest service continuity as required by  Gas and Electrical 
Power Authority (AEEG) provisions [10]. 
In order to fulfill these requirements, all the interventions for 
pipe modification must be performed without interrupting the gas 
flow to the users, and this is achieved due to the interconnection 
and redundancy of the network, by sectioning the pipe on both 
sides of the work location. 
This procedure involves boring the pipe and inserting rubber 
balloons that are then inflated to stop the gas flow, producing 
therefore natural gas releases. Such releases give rise to 
explosive atmospheres with variable dimensions and shapes, 
depending on the work procedure and on the proper execution 
of the procedure itself (malfunctions or unexpected events are 
always possible). 
Experimental measures have been conducted to determine 
the duration of the work operations and the extension of the 
hazardous zones produced by the gas release and are 
described in this section. 
 
B.  Description of the maintenance intervention 
 
A typical intervention on a gas pipe is made of the following 
five phases: 
 work preparation; 
 interruption of the gas flow; 
 inerting of the sectioned pipe 
 execution of the required maintenance work; 
 purging the pipe to remove air. 
 
1)  Work preparation:  A trench is opened to reach the pipe 
on which the following operations are to be carried on. An 
electrical bonding connection is made for metallic pipings, in 
order to connect different metallic parts and prevent the 
formation of sparks when the pipe sections are separated from 
each other. 
2)  Interruption of the gas flow:  On both sides of the work 
location, the gas pipe is bored on its center-line, using a manual 
or pneumatic pipe-boring machine equipped with a hole saw. 
The hole diameters depend on the pipe cross section and range 
from 1 inch to a maximum of 4 inches. The pipe-boring machine 
is connected tightly to the pipe due to a threaded sleeve or 
collar depending on the piping material (Fig. 1). The boring 
phase, which may require several minutes, does not produce 
significant releases, since the pipe-boring machine is connected 
to the sleeve using a sealing o-ring. The gas concentration in 
the sleeve is therefore largely above the UEL (upper explosive 
limit). When the pipe has been bored, the machine is removed 
and the gas flow is stopped with the insertion of a blocking 
balloon (Fig. 2). 
 
 
Fig. 1 of the pipe-boring machine and of the collar on a steel 
pipe 
 
As the pipe-boring machine is removed, the hole behaves like a 
source of release, approximately of the same cross section of 
the entire hole. The release lasts for the time required to insert 
the balloon and stop the hole with the frustum of cone plug. 
Since the gas flow has to be interrupted in two points (marked 
with the letters A and B in Fig. 3), the same procedure, with the 
same characteristics and releases, is repeated twice.  
 
 
Fig. 2 Blocking balloons with frustum of cone plugs to  stop 
the pipe holes; the deflated balloon is strengthened by an 
aluminium sheet which constitutes a protection against sparks 
originated by welding operations. 
 
When maintenance work is carried out on steel pipes, and 
therefore welding is necessary, even a very small leak through 
the interruption points could be extremely dangerous. For this 
reason two rubber balloons instead of one are inserted into the 
pipe and the volume between them is filled with water, forming a 
wet seal. The situation at this stage is illustrated in Fig. 3. 
 
 
Fig. 3 Interruption of the gas flow inserting two balloons in 
each hole opened in the gas pipe to create a wet seal. 
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3)  Inerting of the sectioned pipe:  After the gas flow has 
been stopped by inserting the rubber balloons at both sides of 
the work location, before the insertion of the third and fourth 
balloons and the formation of the wet seal, the gas which is still 
contained in the pipe must be discharged. This is obtained by 
injecting an inert gas into the pipe through one of the holes 
previously bored in it: the natural gas is therefore forced out 
through the other hole. This constitutes a release which is 
regulated by the inert gas injection; the natural gas emitted is 
mixed with the inert gas. 
4)  Execution of the required maintenance work:  The pipe is 
then cut using a manual pipe cutter which, in case of metallic 
piping, does not produce sparks. The following assembly is 
carried out by welding in case of steel pipes, by using flange 
couplings in case of cast iron pipes and by electrofusion in case 
of polyethylene pipes. 
5)  Purging the pipe to remove air:  The final phase of the 
intervention consists in the removal of the rubber balloons and 
wet seal, if present. However, before this phase can be carried 
out, the pipe has to be purged in order to remove the air that 
has entered it. This is performed by removing completely one of 
the two sectioning points, which produces a gas release from 
the hole bored in the pipe (the cross section of the source of 
release, however, is not the full cross section of the hole, 
because the rubber balloons being extracted limit the gas flow 
and because the operator partially plugs the opening). As soon 
as the first sectioning point is removed, the plug of the second 
sectioning hole is removed: the air-gas mixture contained in the 
pipe is ejected. The gas concentration in the ejected mixture is 
measured and when it reaches nearly the 100% (which means 
that all the air/nitrogen has been expelled, the operation 
finishes: the last balloon is removed and the hole is closed. 
 
C.  Anomalous events during the  intervention 
 
During the typical intervention previously described, 
unexpected events may arise increasing the releases duration, 
and influencing the extent of the hazardous zones. 
The most critical phase from this point of view is the 
interruption of the gas flow using the rubber balloons. 
These devices are tested before the intervention being 
inflated and deflated. However damage to a rubber balloon may 
occur during its insertion through the hole bored in the pipe. The 
damage would appear while trying to inflate the balloon itself, 
thus requiring its extraction and substitution. During these 
operations the release would be much longer than that in 
standard operations. 
The modeling chosen for this event is a 10 s release through 
the full hole cross section. This outflow duration is sufficient to 
reach a steady state gas concentration condition. 
 
 
D.  System modeling 
 
The object of this work is the evaluation of the extension of 
the hazardous zones produced by the gas releases previously 
described. Two situations are modeled: the normal situation, in 
which the releases last a few seconds and are characterized by 
a strong transient, and the abnormal situation, in which the 
releases last a longer time and are characterized by reaching a 
steady state gas concentration condition. 
However, the presence of the workers can limit and deflect 
the outflow introducing a random factor which is not repeatable. 
Practically, the two different situations can be characterized 
as follows: 
Normal situation: 
 Short and small outflows 
 Gas outflows reduced and diverted by presence of 
workers 
 Gas outflows do not reach steady state gas 
concentration levels. 
 Hazardous area is not clearly identified because of 
workers’ presence and operation. 
Abnormal situation:  
 Long and consistent outflows 
 Workers’ normally leave the area and therefore do not 
interfere with gas outflow behavior. 
 Gas outflows reach a steady state gas concentration 
condition. 
 Hazardous area contours can be identified. 
Therefore, normal situations modeling is actually impossible, 
because events are characterized by key transients that are not 
repeatable. On the other hand, abnormal situations modeling is 
feasible, under the following  conditions: 
 No workers’ presence during gas outflows  
 Gas outflows reach steady state gas concentration levels 
 Ventilation based on calm wind conditions 
 Hazardous area contours can be identified with a cone 
whose maximum angle can be 40 to 60°. 
 
E.  Experimental tests 
 
Tests have been performed in an area, property of the major 
Italian gas distribution company, which has been set up with a 
trench and some pipes that reproduce a portion of the 
distribution network. The pipe used for the tests described in this 
paper has a cross section of 150 mm and is fed with natural gas 
on both sides, thanks to a by-pass, with a pressure of 20 mbar, 
to better simulate a portion of urban interconnected distribution 
network (see Fig. 4). 
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Fig. 4 Trench and pipe in test area. 
 
Tests have been performed in order to define a model 
representing gas outflow under the abnormal conditions 
described in the previous paragraph. An outflow hole with a 1 
inch diameter has been chosen. 
Natural gas concentrations have been measured with eight 
gas detectors. These detectors are able to measure natural gas 
concentrations in the range between 0% and 5% (percentages 
of volume), with an accuracy of  0.5‰ and a sampling rate of 10 
s. At each measurement step, the instrument detects the 
maximum and the minimum value of the gas concentration. 
When the concentration exceeds the 5% an “Overflow” 
message is reported and no values are stored. 
Each test has been performed using 8 gas sensors, whose 
clocks had been previously synchronized. 
Three different gas sensors configurations have been used to 
determine the extension of the hazardous zone, which was 
assumed conic: 
1. Gas sensors placed along the outflow axis. The first one 
has been positioned at 2.56 m from the hole; the other 7 
sensors have been placed at 30 cm from each other. 
2. Gas sensors placed along the outflow axis. The first one 
has been positioned at 2.86 m from the hole; the other 7 
sensors have been placed at 30 cm from each other. 
3. Radial arrangement of the gas sensors, on two different 
levels: on a plane orthogonal to the outflow axis, at a height of 
75 cm from the source of release and on a plane orthogonal to 
the outflow axis, at a height of 150 cm from the source of 
release. 
The sensors are quite small and so the deflection of the gas 
stream can be neglected. 
The positioning schemes of Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 have been used 
in order to evaluate the natural gas concentration trend along 
the outflow direction, as a function of different distances from 
the hole, and the width of the hazardous zone (assumed conic). 
The initial hypothesis about shape and dimensions of the 
hazardous zone was confirmed also due to the support given by 
an infrared camera sensitive to methane. 
 
 
Fig. 5 Gas sensors placed along the outflow axis. 
 
 
Fig. 6 Radial arrangement of the gas sensors 
 
The IR camera, which senses the different thermal behavior of 
the gas and air molecules, was used to identify the height and 
width of the release cone (Fig. 7). 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Frame from the film recorded by the IR camera during 
a gas release. 
 
In order to improve contrast in the shooting, two sides of the 
area have been  covered with a 4 m high sheet. Such a choice 
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certainly influenced the tests, slightly modifying the ventilation 
conditions. However this effect is considered negligible since the 
tests were performed in calm wind conditions. Moreover the 
error committed improves safety as wind tends to dilute the 
flammable atmosphere 
 
F.  Tests results 
 
The gas detectors provided, both on the outflow axis and on 
the two horizontal planes, the trend of the concentration peaks  
reached in each 10 s time interval, for every measurement point 
(shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6). From these values the overall 
peaks registered during the whole test are extracted. The 
detectors which produced an “overflow” message are discarded. 
The mean values of the peaks registered (CP) in the different 
tests are reported in Table III for the outflow axis disposition and 
in Table IV for the radial arrangement. 
 
TABLE III 
MEAN OF THE PEAK VALUES REGISTERED IN THE DIFFERENT 
TESTS ON THE OUTFLOW AXIS 
Detector Height [m] CP [%] 
SV1 2.56 >5 
SV2 2.86 >5 
SV3 3.16 3.450 
SV4 3.46 2.675 
SV5 3.76 2.575 
SV6 4.06 2.175 
SV7 4.36 1.650 
SV8 4.66 1.625 
SV9 4.96 0.900 
 
TABLE IV 
MEAN OF THE PEAK VALUES REGISTERED IN THE DIFFERENT 
TESTS ON THE HORIZONTAL PLANES 
Detector Height [m] Horizontal distance [m] CP [%] 
SO1 0.75 0.15 >5 
SO2 0.75 0.24 2.300 
SO3 0.75 0.33 0.450 
SO4 0.75 0.42 0.125 
SO5 1.5 0.25 >5 
SO6 1.5 0.34 >5 
SO7 1.5 0.43 3.500 
SO8 1.5 0.52 1.725 
 
G.  Experimental data processing 
 
The aim of this work is the definition of the distribution of the 
natural gas concentration near the source of release. On the 
basis of the previously advanced hypothesis of conic shape with 
vertex on the source of release, the concentration values 
measured by the vertical and horizontal sensors have been 
used to determine height and width of the cone itself. 
In particular, to determine the vertex angle of the cone, the 
sensors located at 150 cm above the source of release have 
been used, leading to more conservative results (i.e. a wider 
angle). 
 
1)  Concentration along the release axis:  The concentration 
trend along the outflow axis (which is vertical) is determined by 
the superposition of two different effects: 
 a momentum effect, due to the pressure of the gas 
inside the pipe;  
 a buoyancy effect, due to the different density between 
natural gas and air (ρgas = 0.6 ρair). 
 
In order to evaluate the two effects, the models suggested in the 
TNO Yellow Book [14] have been chosen. The adopted 
simplification is based on the separation of the two effects: in 
the first part of the outflow, only the momentum effect, which is 
predominant, has been considered, and the buoyancy effect has 
been neglected; in the second part of the outflow only the 
buoyancy effect has been taken into account, while the 
momentum effect, considered to be already finished, has been 
neglected. A concentration decay in inverse relation to the 
distance from the source of release was used for the 
momentum effect: 
1
1)(
ty
k
yC                                   (2) 
where: 
 C(y) is the natural gas concentration along the outflow 
axis; 
 k1 and t1 are two constants which were determined to 
best approximate the experimental data. 
A concentration decay in inverse relation to the distance raised 
to 5/3 was used for the buoyancy effect: 
3
5
2
2
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k
yC

                             (3) 
where: 
 C(y) is the natural gas concentration along the outflow 
axis; 
 k2 and t2 are two constants which were determined to 
best approximate the experimental data. 
 
The first decay law appears to be a good approximation of the 
concentration measured by the gas sensors up to 3.5 m from 
the source of release, while the second decay law appears to be 
a good approximation above 4.3 m from it. The concentration 
trend in the interval between 3.5 and 4.3 m has been assumed 
linear, to connect the two curves. In Fig. 8 the measured data 
and the approximation curves following the two decay laws 
previously presented are reported. 
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Fig. 8 Gas concentration trend along the outflow axis. 
 
2)  Concentration on a plane perpendicular to the outflow 
axes:  The concentration trend on a plane perpendicular to the 
outflow axis has been measured at two different heights, as 
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previously described. Of the two sets of measures, the most 
conservative one has been chosen (with sensors located at 150 
cm from the source of release). Assumed that the outflow is 
axisimmetric (i.e. the wind effect has been neglected), the radial 
concentration trend has been modeled with an exponential law 
[14]. From the experimental data, concentration values were 
available only in two points (see Table IV), since the two 
innermost sensors reached the overflow (concentration above 
5%). The coefficients used to define the exponential law have 
been determined forcing the intersection with the outflow axis at 
the concentration value obtained through the model described in 
the previous paragraph, and optimizing the interpolation of the 
available experimental data. 
0
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Fig. 9 Gas concentration trend on a plane perpendicular to 
the outflow axis. 
 
The obtained model is described through equation (4): 
xkekxC  43)(                              (4) 
where: 
 C(x) is the natural gas concentration on the horizontal 
plane; 
 k3 and k4 are two constants which has been determined 
to force the intersection with the y axis as previously 
described and to best approximate the experimental 
data. 
 
In Fig. 9 the measured data and the approximation curve are 
reported. The values determined for the coefficients of 
equations (2), (3) and (4) are reported in Table V. 
 
TABLE V 
COEFFICIENTS 
Coefficient k1 t1 k2 t2 k3 k4
Value 5.5 1.5 6 2.2 75 0.072 
 
H.  Definition of the hazardous zone on the basis of the 
experimental tests 
 
The release produced for the experimental tests is 
comparable to that caused by unexpected events during the 
maintenance intervention, so that the phenomenon reaches a 
steady state condition. Such a situation is the worst possible 
and, according to Standard IEC EN 60079-10 [5], can be 
classified as a secondary grade of release. 
Since the release takes place outside in calm wind conditions, 
the availability of the ventilation is considered good, while its 
degree is considered medium. The hazardous zone is therefore 
Zone 2 (see Table II). 
The hazardous volume has been determined through the 
experimental data and their subsequent elaboration (see § IV. 
G. ); similarly to what is suggested in the Italian Guide CEI 31-
35 [6], the volume in which the flammable gas concentration is 
higher then kdz • LELv (with kdz =0.5) is defined “Zone 2”. 
 
Fig. 10 Gas concentration near the source of release, as 
determined through experimental data. 
 
The situation is summarized in Fig. 10, where it can be seen 
that Zone 2 (volume in which the gas concentration is higher 
then kdz • LELv = 2%) is a cone 4.12 m high with a vertex angle 
of 36°. 
 
I.  Comparison with the Italian Guide calculation 
 
For the release on which the experimental tests have been 
carried out, on the basis of equation (1), having set kdz = 0.5, the 
computed hazardous distance dz is: 
 
        

0.5 0.4 4 0.5
z
z
1650d 0.02 1.01325 16.34 (5.07 10 )
0.5 3.93
d 6.3m
 
 
The hazardous zone determined following the guidelines of 
the Italian Guide CEI 31-35 [6] is therefore a conic volume, with 
vertex on the source of release, vertex angle of 90° and height 
of 6.3 m. 
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V.  HAZARDOUS AREA PRODUCED BY A POOL OF 
FLAMMABLE LIQUID 
 
As previously stated, a hazardous area is produced when a 
pool of flammable liquid is in contact with the atmosphere. 
After an assessment of the size of the explosive cloud has 
been made using a simulation software, a number of 
approximate relations are obtained for determining the 
hazardous zone. 
 
A.  Theoretical basis 
 
In this paragraph the potentially explosive volume produced 
by a pool of flammable liquid is described. The examined pool 
was located on the ground, in the open, and the flammable 
liquid was assumed as being at ambient temperature, with a 
boiling point higher than the ambient temperature. 
In this situation, a certain amount of vapours, with an 
evaporation rate g, are released from the pool, the release 
being a function of the characteristics of the substance and the 
intensity of the wind. For the determination of the dispersion in 
the atmosphere of vapours issuing from the flammable 
substance, it is possible to apply approximate analytical models. 
The model most widely used, which is valid within the limits of 
certain simplified hypotheses, is a point source with evaporated 
gases dispersed vertically and horizontally according to a 
Gaussian curve, the standard deviation σ of which varies 
according to the direction considered. 
In Fig. 11 an example is provided: the source of release is 
located in the axes origin and the wind direction is along the x 
axis. The Gaussian curves represent the concentration of the 
vapour in the y and z directions at different distances from the 
source of release. 
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Fig. 11 Gaussian model of release 
 
The distribution of gas in the atmosphere is influenced by 
numerous factors, among which are the weather conditions, the 
characteristics of the ground around the pool (e.g. the presence 
of trees, buildings, etc.), wind speed and so forth. For the 
calculation of the distribution in the various points of space, it is 
possible to use approximate formulas obtained from 
experimental findings [9]. 
In the case where the source of emission is of large 
dimensions, as in the case of vaporization from a pool of 
flammable liquid, the area of release cannot be assimilated to a 
point source and it is necessary to make further approximations. 
If an assessment is made of concentrations at a sufficiently 
large distance from the source assuming that the surface of the 
source itself is quite extensive, it is possible to substitute for the 
actual source a virtual point source located at an appropriate 
distance upwind of the real source. In other words, the distant 
virtual source is assumed to produce, in the area of the actual 
source, an emission having the same characteristics and 
dimensions as the actual source itself. For this purpose, the two 
sources must release the same amount of substance, and the 
cloud discharged by the virtual source must “cover” the entire 
real source. 
The computation procedures and the above mentioned 
relations were applied to the case of a pool of gasoline. Fig. 12 
shows the distance to which the lower explosion limit (LEL) 
extends in the direction of the wind (x axes) as a function of the 
area of the pool (wind speed 5 m/s). 
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Fig. 12 Maximum distance from source, in downwind direction 
(x axis) and in vertical direction (z axis), at which the LEL 
concentration is reached. Wind speed 5 m/s 
 
In the same figure are shown the distances of LEL in the 
direction of the wind (x axes) and in the vertical direction (z 
axes) estimated using two of the most widely used simulation 
software devised for evaluating hazardous emissions [15]. An 
example of the results of the simulation is presented in Fig. 13. 
 
Fig. 13 Simulation results 
 
 
B.  Simplified computational procedure 
 
Taking as a reference the simulation model and 
approximating with an exponential function the variations in the 
distances at which the LEL concentration is reached in the 
direction of the wind (X) and upwards (Z), it is possible to simply 
relate the size of the cloud to the wind speed and the pool area. 
The following relations have been obtained: 
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1 0.65.5X w A     for w < 2 m/s 
0.3 0.63.5X w A     for w > 2 m/s         (5) 
0.8 0.30.03Z w A    
 
where: 
w is the wind speed in m/s; 
A is the area of the pool in m2. 
 
Fig. 14 shows a comparison, for the x axes, of the distances 
indicated by simulations (polygons) with those obtained from the 
above relations (solid lines). 
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Fig. 14 Maximum distance from source, in downwind direction 
(x axis), at which the LEL concentration is reached, obtained 
from relations (5) (solid lines) and using the simulation model 
(Polygons)   
 
The size of the area with risk of explosion around the pool 
may be determined on the basis of the considerations and 
calculations presented in the foregoing sections. In general, the 
area extends symmetrically around the pool (Fig. 15), starting 
from its edge for a distance d, and upwards for a height h. The 
dimensions d and h may be calculated through equations (5) 
using an appropriate safety factor k > 1. 
 
d
d
h
 
Fig. 15 Extent of the dangerous area around a pool of 
flammable liquid at ground level. 
 
The relations obtained make it possible to calculate, simply 
but with good approximation, the main dimensions of the 
explosive cloud for this type of hydrocarbon pool. 
The coefficients indicated in the relations are valid only for 
gasoline and in the environmental conditions previously 
described. However, within certain limits, the variations in the 
size of the cloud, as temperature varies, or in the case of 
flammable substances other than gasoline, may be derived on a 
percentage basis, from the Gaussian model and applied, using 
appropriate corrective coefficients, to the relations (5). 
 
 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper presents two typical cases of releases of 
flammable substances (gases or vapours), which produce 
hazardous areas due to the risk of explosion. For both cases, a 
model (physical in the first case, numerical in the second) is built 
and used to evaluate the size of the hazardous area. The 
experimental data of the gas release fits quite well the 
theoretical model suggested by the Italian Guide [6] for the 
calculation of the hazardous area boundary distance. Actually, 
the theoretical model is more conservative than the 
experimental, leading to a bigger distance dz which has in the 
presented case an extra margin (or safety factor) of around 30% 
above the experimental one. 
The size of the hazardous area defined in this way can 
therefore be applied by the workers who perform maintenance 
intervention on the natural gas distribution network. 
In the case of a pool of flammable liquid, it is shown that the 
simplified equations can be used to determine the extent of the 
hazardous area instead of having to run simulations. 
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